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ABSTRACT 
The dispute between defenders and opponents of extended cognition (EC) has come to a dead 
end as no agreement on what the mark of the cognitive is could be found. Recently, many 
authors, therefore, have pursued a different strategy: they focus on the notion of constitution 
rather than the notion of cognition to determine whether constituents of cognitive phenomena 
can be external to the brain. One common strategy is to apply the new mechanists’ mutual 
manipulability account (MM). In this paper, I will analyze whether this strategy can be 
successful. Thereby, I will focus on David Kaplan’s (2012) version of this strategy. It will turn 
out that MM alone is insufficient for answering the question whether EC is true or not. What I 
call the Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive 
behaviors are extended in a way that nobody would want to count as cases of EC. I will argue 
that this challenge can be met by adding a further necessary condition: cognitive constituents 
of mechanisms satisfy MM and they are what I call behavior unspecific. 
 
Keywords: extended mind, situated cognition, constitution, processes, mechanistic 
explanation, mutual manipulability 
1 Introduction 
The different theories of what I will subsume under the label “Extended Cognition” or “EC” 
essentially make claims about what constitutes cognition. According to defenders of EC, 
cognition is not only constituted by features of the brain but by perception-action loops between 
an organism and its environment (Enactivism), parts of the extracranial body (Embodiment), or 
tools and other aspects of the external physical and social environment (Extendedness). 
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Examples that are taken to support EC are the role of saccadic eye-movements in the 
performance of memory tasks (Kaplan, 2012, p. 563; Wilson, 2004, p. 194), the use of a 
notebook in spatial navigation (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), an artist using a sketch pad (Hutto & 
Myin, 2017), Tetris players rotating blocks on a screen instead of mentally rotating them (Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994), the role of bodily action in vision (Gibson, 1966; O’Regan & Noë, 2001), 
and the role of gestures in problem-solving, language production and processing (Chu & Kita, 
2011; Clark, 2010; Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2013; Hostetter & Alibali, 2007), to name just 
a few. The differences between these examples and the differences between the claims they are 
supposed to support will not be relevant here. The question that is addressed here and that is 
answered affirmatively by all theories of EC: Is cognition (at least sometimes partly) constituted 
by processes external to the brain? 
Opponents of EC object that all examples that defenders of EC invoke to support their 
claims can be explained in terms of mere causal interactions between the brain and its 
environment (this claim is called Embeddedness, see Rupert (2009)). The brain remains the 
only intelligible bearer of cognition. Still, it is crucially embedded in a body, perception-action 
loops, and an external environment that contribute inputs to the brain that, then, generates 
outputs into the body and the external environment. 
The debate between defenders and opponents of EC has come to a dead end. David 
Kaplan (2012) argues that this is the case because, so far, no agreement on what determines 
cognition could been reached. According to Kaplan, defenders as well as contester of EC have 
put forward what he calls proprietary demarcation criteria that provide intensional 
characterizations of what defines cognition—or in other words: what the mark of cognition is. 
The debate is stagnating because these proprietary criteria all rest on assumptions that are 
rejected by the respective opposing camp (Kaplan, 2012, p. 549) (see also Hutto and Myin 
(2013, Chapter 7)). For example, Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, who are among the most 
prominent opponents of EC, characterize cognition in terms of non-derived intentional content. 
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This characterization is rejected by many defenders of EC due to the notorious difficulty to 
naturalize intentionality. One characterization that is put forward by defenders of EC, such as 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers, is the  parity principle (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), according 
to which a process is cognitive if we would not hesitate calling it ‘cognitive’ if it occurred in 
the head. This, again, is criticized by opponents of EC because it rests on a rather course grained 
individuation of causal roles (Kaplan, 2012, p. 550; Rupert, 2010). Since both parties work with 
characterizations of the mark of cognition that fits their own purposes but is rejected by the 
respective other camp, they are talking past each other rather than being engaged in a fruitful 
philosophical debate. 
To revive the debate, some authors (Abramova & Slors, 2018; Gallagher, 2018; 
Hewitson, Kaplan, & Sutton, 2018; Kaplan, 2012; Kirchhoff, 2015, 2017; Pöyhönen, 2014; 
Theiner, Allen, & Goldstone, 2010; van Eck & Looren de Jong, 2016; Zednik, 2011) leave the 
search for the mark of cognition behind and instead focus on the “mark of constitution.” 
(Baumgartner & Wilutzky, 2017, p. 1105). One popular strategy is to apply tools from the new 
mechanistic literature to make sense of constitution in the context of EC. The most promising 
tool is the new mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability account (MM) of constitutive relevance 
(Craver, 2007b, 2007a) (it has even been adopted by working biologists (Japyassú & Laland, 
2017)). Roughly, MM characterizes constitution in terms of two necessary conditions: (i) the 
constituents are spatiotemporal parts of the constituted phenomenon, and (ii) the constituents 
and the phenomenon are mutually manipulable. Applying MM to EC is prima facie promising 
because it provides a mark of constitution that is independent of any mark of cognition. 
Furthermore, as such, MM should be acceptable by defenders and opponents of EC alike given 
its success in other areas of (philosophy of) science.  
In this paper, I analyze whether MM can be put to use for the purpose of defending EC. 
The most prominent and elaborated version of this strategy is David Kaplan’s (2012) approach, 
which will be the focus of this paper. I discuss two objections against Kaplan’s account that 
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have been raised by Michael Baumgartner and Wendy Wilutzky (2017)—what I call the 
Inconsistency Problem and the Parthood Problem—and show how they can be rejected. 
Although the two problems can be solved, the first goal of this paper is to show that MM alone 
cannot be sufficient to argue for EC. The reason is that many mechanisms for cognitive 
behaviors involve the body or the external surrounding in a way that should not be counted as 
making the case for EC – I call this the Challenge of Trivial Extendedness (CTE). For example, 
leg movements will come out as satisfying MM relative to the performance of spatial memory 
tasks such as finding the exit in a maze; arm movements will satisfy MM relative to the behavior 
of creating a copy of patterns of blocks and relative to the behavior of using a sketch pad in 
creative thinking. Though these examples suggest that our limbs are often components of the 
mechanisms for our cognitive behaviors, they do not show that cognition is extended in any 
relevant way – trivially, we need our body to move around or to move external objects. 
In order to save the strategy pursued by Kaplan and others, one way to meet the CTE is 
to admit that MM alone is not sufficient to determine what the cognitive constituents of a 
cognitive behavior are. In order to identify those, MM has to be combined with a further 
criterion in line with the new mechanistic thinking that excludes the trivial cases of extended 
or embodied cognition. The second goal of this paper is to develop such a criterion in terms of 
what I call behavior specificity and show how extracranial elements might satisfy it. 
More specifically, the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I will present MM (Section 
2.1) and Kaplan’s approach (Section 2.2) in more detail. In Section 3, I will discuss three 
objections against MM’s application to EC: I present and solve the Inconsistency Problem (3.1) 
and the Parthood Problem (3.2) and introduce the Challenge of Trivial Extendedness (3.3). In 
Section 4, I will discuss different proposals for how to meet the challenge. In Section 4.1, I will 
show why the notion of causal specificity will not be of much help (contra Hewitson, Kaplan, 
and Sutton (2018)). In Section 4.2, I will introduce a novel suggestion and show how it can be 
used to provide a new definition of what it is to be a cognitive constituent. Roughly, I will 
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argue, that cognitive constituents are components of mechanisms that are behavior unspecific. 
I will present an example that suggests that even extra-cranial elements can sometimes be 
behavior unspecific in this sense. Hence, EC may indeed be true: (at least sometimes) cognition 
seems to be (partly) constituted by processes external to the brain. 
2 Constitution in Terms of Mutual Manipulability  
2.1 The Mutual Manipulability Approach 
The central claim of the so-called new mechanists is that explanations in the special sciences, 
especially biology, are mechanistic. Mechanistic explanations refer to the causal structures (i.e., 
mechanisms) underlying or causing the phenomena-to-be-explained. ‘Underlying’, thereby, is 
understood in terms of mechanistic constitution, or constitutive relevance.1 One prominent 
example of such a constitutive mechanistic explanation is the explanation of spatial memory. 
Spatial memory is often investigated by observing mice navigating the Morris water maze (a 
pool filled with an opaque liquid; the mouse is supposed to find a platform that is hidden under 
the surface of the liquid). Spatial memory is instantiated in the mouse’s navigation behavior 
(the phenomenon), and the mouse’s hippocampus generating spatial maps is supposed to be a 
component of the mechanism responsible for that navigation behavior (Bechtel, 2008; Bechtel 
& Richardson, 2010; Craver, 2007b). Other examples of phenomena that are constitutive-
mechanistically explained are the action potential (Craver, 2007b, pp. 114–122), the human 
heart pumping blood (Bechtel, 2006; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver & Darden, 2013; 
Glennan, 2010), a cell synthesizing proteins (Craver & Darden, 2013; Darden, 2002; 
Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000), and long-term potentiation at synapses of neurons 
(Craver, 2007b, pp. 65–72; Craver & Darden, 2001, pp. 115–17, 2013, pp. 167–72; Machamer 
et al., 2000, pp. 8–11).  
                                               
1 Mechanistic constitution is the relation between the mechanism as a whole and the phenomenon; constitutive 
relevance relates single components of a mechanism and the phenomenon. 
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According to Craver (2007b, 2007a), in constitutive mechanistic explanations one refers 
to components of mechanisms that are constitutively relevant for the phenomenon. He specifies 
this notion in his Mutual Manipulability account (MM): 
(MM) X’s Φ-ing is constitutively relevant for S’s Ψ-ing iff: 
(i) X’s Φ-ing is a part of S’s Ψ-ing, and 
(ii) X’s Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing are mutually manipulable. (Craver, 2007b, p. 153) 
X represents an entity (e.g., a hippocampus, a stomach, a neuron); the Φ-ing stands for the 
activity performed by X (e.g., generating spatial maps, digesting, firing), S represents a system 
(e.g., a mouse, a human, a car), where the Ψ-ing is a behavior of S (e.g., navigating through a 
maze, walking, accelerating). MM states that in order for an X’s Φ-ing to be constitutively 
relevant for a Ψ-ing of a particular S two conditions have to be satisfied: first, constituents are 
parts of what they constitute. Following Leuridan (2012, p. 410), parthood, in this context, can 
be understood as follows:  
(Parthood)  X’s Φ-ing is a part of an S’s Ψ-ing iff the spatiotemporal region occupied by 
X’s Φ-ing is contained in the spatiotemporal region of S’s Ψ-ing. 
For example, the hippocampus’s generating spatial maps is a part of the mouse’s navigation 
behavior because its spatiotemporal region is contained in the spatiotemporal region occupied 
by the mouse during its navigating. In the same sense, the mouse’s stomach digesting or a virus 
infecting a cell can be part of the mouse navigating as well. In contrast to the latter two 
examples, constituents additionally satisfy the mutual manipulability condition. Mutual 
manipulability is taken to consist of two manipulations: 
(Manipulations) 
(i) Bottom-up intervention: there is an ideal intervention on X’s Φ-ing with 
respect to S’s Ψ-ing that changes S’s Ψ-ing (or its probability distribution); 
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(ii) Top-down intervention: there is an ideal intervention on S’s Ψ-ing with respect 
to X’s Φ-ing that changes X’s Φ-ing (or its probability distribution). (Craver, 
2007b, p. 153) 
Ideal interventions, thereby, are spelled out in terms of Woodwardian interventionism 
(Woodward, 2003) (see Leuridan (2012)). Roughly, an intervention I on X’s Φ-ing with respect 
to S’s Ψ-ing is ideal only if X’s Φ-ing changes only due to the influence of I and S’s Ψ-ing is 
not changed by I directly.  
Importantly, constitutive relevance is a non-causal relation. If an X’s Φ-ing is 
constitutively relevant for S’s Ψ-ing, then it is impossible that X’s Φ-ing causes S’s Ψ-ing (and 
vice versa) (Craver, 2007b; Craver & Bechtel, 2007). Most arguments in favor of this claim are 
based on the assumption that X’s Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing are not wholly distinct events because 
X’s Φ-ing occupies a sub-region of the spatiotemporal region of S’s Ψ-ing (condition (i)) and 
both are mutually dependent (condition (ii)) (Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Romero, 2015).2 
However, one platitude about causation is that its relata have to be wholly distinct (Craver and 
Bechtel 2007; Lewis 1973; 1986). Thus, it follows that causal relevance and constitutive 
relevance are mutually exclusive relations. 
 
                                               
2 A further argument in favor of the claim that constitutive relevance is a non-causal relation is that otherwise we 
are confronted with causal loops (Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Romero, 2015). 
Causal loops are held to be problematic because, roughly, their existence would imply that something could be the 
cause of its own cause (Kim, 1999; Romero, 2015). Causal loops are unproblematic if they are taken to be feedback 
loops where an effect is a cause of an effect that is of the same type as the cause of the first effect. The problematic 
element comes in when assuming that the putative cause and effect occur at the same time. A further argument 
Romero provides is based on exclusion worries arguing that if constitutive relevance would be a causal notion that 
would imply that there is downward causation, which is not compatible with the causal closure of the physical. 
This argument does not depend on the assumption that the relata of constitutive relevance are parts and wholes. I 
will not discuss this objection in the present paper. For a discussion of exclusion worries in the context of 
interventionism see Baumgartner (2009), Woodward (2015), and Gebharter (2015). A discussion of exclusion 
worries concerning causation between mechanistic levels see Craver (2007b, Chapter 6), and between parts and 
wholes see Kim (1998, p. 84). 
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2.2 Applying Mutual Manipulability to Extended Cognition 
In a recent paper, David Kaplan (2012) suggests to use MM to make sense of constitution in 
the context of EC. Using the mutual manipulability account is promising for several reasons. 
First, it does not depend on any specification of what defines cognition (Kaplan, 2012, p. 557). 
According to Kaplan, the mutual manipulability account provides a generic demarcation 
criterion that specifies the extension of cognition without depending on any intensional 
characterization of ‘cognition.’ Instead of starting with a definition of ‘cognition’, the strategy 
is to focus on examples that everyone accepts as cognitive (for an application of this strategy 
see also Newen (2017)). If these examples turn out to be cases of extended, embodied, or 
enacted cognition, EC is true. Since the mutual manipulability account deals with constituents 
of the behaviors of specific objects (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017; Baumgartner & Gebharter, 
2016; Kaiser & Krickel, 2017), Kaplan focusses on behaviors of specific objects as well—in 
this case cognitive behaviors of human agents (Kaplan does not make this explicit but I take it 
to be a valid description of what he is doing).  
Note that this strategy does not identify cognition with (a type of) behavior (for a criticism 
of the claim that cognition is (a type of) behavior see Aizawa (2017)). Kaplan only starts from 
the assumption that, intuitively, some behaviors involve cognition in a relevant way. Behaviors 
like walking, moving your arms, and scratching your nose are usually not taken to involve 
cognition in a way that would validate EC (while these behaviors might still be caused by a 
(purely internal) cognitive process). But everyone agrees that behaviors performed by human 
subjects such as copying a pattern of colored blocks, solving a math problem, thinking about 
what you had for lunch yesterday, learning how to play the piano, or typing a text on a keyboard 
are cognitive in a more substantial way. In this sense, Kaplan starts with an extensional 
characterization of cognition, i.e., with a list of examples that count as cognitive phenomena 
and those that do not. Kaplan’s strategy now is not to ask the question “What makes these 
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behaviors cognitive?” Rather, he asks “What constitutes these behaviors?” to determine 
whether the constituents can be found outside the brain. 
A second reason why Kaplan’s suggestion is promising is that, as specified in the previous 
sub-section, constitution in terms of MM is taken to be a non-causal relation (Bechtel, 2008; 
Craver, 2007b; Craver & Bechtel, 2007). Hence applying MM to EC is promising with respect 
to avoiding the coupling-constitution (CC) fallacy which poses a challenge for arguments in 
favor of EC (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008, 2010; Aizawa, 2010). According to Fred Adams 
and Ken Aizawa, many arguments for EC rely on an inference from a causal relation between 
a cognitive element and an external element to a constitution-claim about the external element 
constituting the cognitive element or about the cognitive and the external element together 
constituting a further cognitive element. This inference, according to Adams and Aizawa, is 
fallacious as there are many cases where elements are causally connected in the way identified 
by defenders of EC but where nobody would want to infer to a constitution-relation. Hence, 
causation cannot be sufficient for constitution. In the light of MM, according to which 
constitution and causation are mutually exclusive relations, it is clear that such a fallacious 
inference is blocked (I will discuss the CC fallacy in the context of MM in more detail in Section 
3.2). 
Third, MM is motivated by and is supposed to account for actual scientific practice. The 
account builds on Woodward’s (2003) interventionism which uses the idea of an ideal 
experiment to spell out what causation is. The underlying notion of an ideal experiment (or an 
ideal intervention) also provides the driving ideal for designing experiments and reasoning 
about experiments in the actual empirical sciences. Craver uses Woodward’s account to provide 
an operational characterization of mechanistic constitution. Hence, using this account in the 
context of EC promises to base the debate on an empirically adequate fundament and it 
promises a framework for evaluating empirical tests of constitution claims in the context of EC. 
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To illustrate his application of MM to EC, Kaplan uses the example of a memory study 
in which subjects have to copy a pattern of colored blocks. In this study it was found that instead 
of memorizing the whole pattern in order to copy it, subjects performed frequent saccadic eye 
movements between the original pattern and the copy they were creating (Ballard et al., 1995; 
Kaplan, 2012, p. 563). According to Kaplan, this shows that the saccadic eye movements are 
constituents of the memory behavior because they satisfy MM: first, by confronting subjects 
with such a memory task, their eye movements changed (top-down intervention) (Kaplan, 2012, 
p. 564). Second, when gaze was fixated to one spot, it took subjects much longer to finish the 
copying task (bottom-up interventions) (Kaplan, 2012, p. 564).  
Indeed, this application seems to provide the right results with regard to non-constituents: 
gravity, although a necessary condition for any memory task, is not constitutive for the copying 
behavior because gravity cannot be changed by intervening into the subject’s behavior during 
the task (while it is possible to change their behavior by changing the influence of gravity on 
the brain). Also, with help of the criterion one can exclude implausible extendedness claims 
such as the claim that perception is constituted by the objects of perception (Rupert, 2009). 
Again, although it is possible to change perception by changing the perceived object, it is not 
possible to change the perceived object by changing perception (e.g., by intervening into V1).  
To summarize: the idea of using MM to defend EC is promising because it is independent 
of any specific definition of what cognition is, it does not rely on a flawed inference from 
causation to constitution, and it promises to provide an empirically testable criterion to solve 
the EC dispute. Still, as I will argue in the next section, the suggestion is confronted with several 
challenges. 
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3 Problems, Solutions, and a Challenge for MM’s Application to EC 
3.1 The Inconsistency Problem  
The first problem is a problem for MM’s application to EC in so far as it poses a general 
challenge for MM. Different authors (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017; Baumgartner & Gebharter, 
2016; Eronen & Brooks, 2014; Kästner, 2017; Leuridan, 2012; Romero, 2015) have argued that 
the combination of interventionism and non-causal dependency relations, as for example 
mechanistic constitution, is problematic (these problems have been discussed in the context of 
EC by Baumgartner and Wilutzky (2017), and van Eck and de Jong (2016)).  
Roughly, the problem is that ideal interventions into phenomena (S’s Ψ-ing) with respect 
to their constituents (a set of Xi’s Φi-ings) (top-down interventions; see Section 2.1) are 
impossible. Interventions into phenomena are necessarily fat-handed, i.e., they are necessarily 
common causes of the phenomenon and a constituent via two independent paths. Ideal 
interventions, as originally defined by Woodward (2003), must not be common causes in this 
way (see Section 2.1). As a consequence, MM fails as it makes use of a theoretical tool 
(interventionism) in a context for which the tool was not made. The Inconsistency Problem thus 
stems from the incompatibility of the criteria defining ideal interventions and constitution.   
In order to address this problem, different authors (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017; 
Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Baumgartner & Wilutzky, 2017) make use of Woodward’s 
modified definition of an ideal intervention (Woodward, 2015) (let’s call this ideal* 
intervention). Ideal* intervention can be fat-handed as long as the two variables relative to 
which it is fat-handed are related by supervenience or any other non-causal dependency 
relation. In order to be able to tell apart causal from constitutive components based on ideal* 
interventions, Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016, p. 748) introduce time into the definition of 
interventionist causation and constitution. Causation takes time, whereas constitution does not. 
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Hence, an ideal* intervention uncovers causal relations only if the two variables change at 
different times, whereas constitution implies simultaneous changes.  
Although by presupposing this modified notion of an ideal intervention one solves the 
Inconsistency Problem, it results in a new problem: it leads to an inconclusive test for 
constitution based on which one can only abductively infer to constitution (Baumgartner & 
Casini, 2017; Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Romero, 2015). This is the case because in 
order to empirically establish that X’s Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing are related by constitutive relevance 
it does not suffice to show that there is one ideal* intervention that leads to simultaneous 
changes in X’s Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing (thought it might suffice based on a further modified notion 
of an intervention; see Baumgartner, Casini, and Krickel (2018)). The reason is that the 
intervention might not have been ideal* at all but rather just an ordinary common cause of the 
changes in X’s Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing.  
In order to establish a constitutive relation, one has to show that all interventions into S’s 
Ψ-ing are fat-handed with respect to S’s Ψ-ing and at least one of its constituents. As this is 
empirically impossible, the best one can do is to show that all interventions actually performed 
are fat-handed in the required sense and argue that the best explanation for this is that the two 
effects are constitutively related. A further downside of this account is that it does not specify 
what it means for an individual part to be a constituent. It only specifies under which conditions 
a set of parts is a set of constituents (Baumgartner et al., 2018; Krickel, 2018). Hence, it remains 
unclear what renders individual parts constitutively relevant for a given phenomenon. 
According to a recent suggestion by Krickel (2018), these problems can be avoided if one 
takes the temporal extendedness of the phenomenon seriously (for further applications of 
Krickel’s account to EC see Gallagher (2018) and Abramova and Slors (2018)). Mice 
navigating water mazes, beating hearts, or action potentials being transmitted are temporally 
extended processes (Krickel takes phenomena to be what she calls ‘entity-involving occurrents’ 
or ‘EIOs’; see also Kaiser and Krickel (2017)). Due to this, they have what Krickel calls 
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‘temporal EIO-parts.’ An example will suffice to get the idea of what temporal EIO-parts are: 
the navigation behavior of the mouse has different temporal EIO-parts such as the moment 
when the mouse is put into the water maze, the different episodes of the swimming such as the 
mouse’s turning left, swimming in circles etc., and finally it’s reaching the platform. In other 
words, temporal EIO-parts could be described as the temporal phases of a given behavior of a 
specific object. 
Based on this analysis of the temporal dimension of mechanistic phenomena, Krickel 
(2018) interprets MM in terms of two causal steps (she calls the resulting approach Causation-
based CR; for an illustration see Figure 1):  
(Causation-based CR) X’s Φ-ing is constitutively relevant for S’s Ψ*-ing iff: 
(i) X’s Φ-ing is a spatial EIO-part of S’s Ψ*-ing,  
(ii) there is a temporal EIO-part of S’s Ψ*-ing that is a cause of X’s Φ-ing, and 
(iii) there is a temporal EIO-part of S’s Ψ*-ing that it is an effect of X’s Φ-ing. 
 
Figure 1 Krickel’s interpretation of MM: mutual manipulability holds between temporal EIO-parts (S’s Ψ*-ing and S’s Ψ**-
ing) of the phenomenon (S’s Ψ-ing) and a constituent (X’s Φ-ing), whereas constitutive relevance is a relation between X’s 
Φ-ing and S’s Ψ-ing (adopted from Krickel (2018), Fig. 6). 
If we think of MM in this way, interventionism can be straightforwardly applied because 
constitution is analyzed in terms of two causal connections—which fall into the original and 
non-problematic area of application of interventionism. Given that S’s Ψ*-ing, S’s Ψ**-ing, 
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and also X’s Φ-ing themselves will have lower-level constituents, mutual manipulability will 
turn out to consist of the following two ideal* interventions: 
1) Bottom-up intervention: an ideal* intervention on X’s Φ-ing and at least one of its 
constituents with respect to S’s Ψ**-ing, which is a temporal EIO-part of S’s Ψ-ing, that 
causes changes in S’s Ψ**-ing (or its probability distribution); 
2) Top-down intervention: an ideal* intervention on S’s Ψ*-ing, which is a temporal EIO-
part of S’s Ψ-ing, and at least one of S’s Ψ*-ing’s constituents with respect to X’s Φ-ing 
that causes changes in X’s Φ-ing (or its probability distribution). 
Even though MM is analyzed in terms of two interventions identifying causal relationships, 
Krickel’s analysis can maintain the distinction between causation and constitution: it still holds 
that if something is a cause of something else, it cannot be a constituent thereof, and vice versa. 
The reason is that constitution holds between S’s ψ-ing and (some of) its parts, whereas the 
relevant causal connections hold between X’s Φ-ing and temporal EIO-parts of S’s ψ-ing of 
which X’s Φ-ing is not a part. Furthermore, this analysis is applicable to individual components 
independently of a set of constituents. One only has to establish that there is a temporal EIO-
part of the phenomenon that is a cause of the individual part and that there is a temporal EIO-
part of the phenomenon that is an effect of that part.  
There is one potential objection against the use of Krickel’s account in the context of EC. 
Her account is non-reductive in the sense that the constitutive relation between X’s Φ-ing and 
S’s Ψ-ing is analyzed in terms of ideal* interventions that are common causes of temporal EIO-
parts of S’s Ψ-ing and at least one of their constituents. Given that interventionism is non-
reductive in general as it spells out what causation is in causal vocabulary, this should not be 
worrisome in general. Krickel’s account is non-viciously circular in the same way in which 
Woodward’s interventionism is non-viciously circular (Woodward, 2003, pp. 20–22). But in 
the context of EC this feature might create a problem: if the constituents of the temporal EIO-
parts of S’s Ψ-ing (on which we intervene in a top-down manner) are external elements, we 
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seem to beg the question against the opponents of EC as we are presupposing that S’s Ψ-ing 
has external constituents (for a related worry see Wilutzky and Baumgartner (2017, pp. 1116–
1117)). The solution to this problem has to wait until the end of Section 3.3 because it requires 
a better understanding of the nature of the cognitive phenomena at issue, and the part-whole 
relation involved. 
 
3.2 The Parthood Problem 
In its original formulation, MM states that the part-whole relation between the phenomenon 
and the constituents is a necessary condition for constitutive relevance. Kaplan seems to drop 
this condition without argument. He summarizes MM as follows: 
(M1) When φ is set to the value φ1 in an (ideal) intervention, then ψ takes on the value 
f(φ1) [or some probability distribution of values f (φ1)]. 
(M2) When ψ is set to the value ψ1 in an (ideal) intervention, then φ takes on the value 
f(ψ1) [or some probability distribution of values f (ψ1)] (Kaplan, 2012, p. 558). 
(Here, φ stands for a lower-level mechanistic component, whereas ψ stands for a higher-level 
phenomenon.) Apparently, according to Kaplan’s reading of MM, mutual manipulability 
between the putative constituent and the phenomenon is sufficient for constitution. However, 
the parthood condition, especially in the context of EC, is crucial. The parthood condition is the 
distinctive difference between constitutive and causal relevance (see Section 2.1). If the 
parthood condition is dropped, constitutive relevance just is causal relevance. In the present 
context, this is especially problematic because it leads Kaplan to commit the famous coupling-
constitution (CC) fallacy. 
The CC fallacy is one of the most prominent objections against constitution-based 
arguments for EC. It is presented and defended in various papers by Adams and Aizawa (Adams 
& Aizawa, 2001, 2008, 2010; Aizawa, 2010). The CC fallacy describes the inference from an 
assumption about a causal connection between two elements to a constitutive connection 
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between these elements or between these elements and a third element as fallacious. For 
example, only because the expansion of a bimetallic strip in a thermostat is causally connected 
to the motion of atoms of the air in the room the thermostat is in does not imply that the 
expansion is constituted by the air atoms as well (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 56). Neither does 
this establish that the air molecules are constituents of whatever is constituted by the expansion 
of the bimetallic strip. 
By dropping the parthood condition, Kaplan’s reconstruction of MM traps into the CC 
fallacy. To see that consider Figure 2 that illustrates the mutual manipulability of two event-
variables X and Y. Assume X represents the event type of being tired and Y stands for the event 
type of sleeping. Being tired causes people to sleep. Sleeping causes people to be less tired. 
Hence, X is a cause of Y, and Y is a cause of X. The two are mutually manipulable. Still, clearly, 
being tired is not constitutive for sleep, and sleep is not constitutive for being tired. Hence, 
inferring from mere mutual manipulability to constitution is to commit the CC fallacy. 
 
Figure 2 Mutual manipulability between variables representing event types. 
This shows that we have to put the parthood condition back into MM. In other words, we have 
to require that in order for an external element to be a constituent of a cognitive behavior, the 
former has to be a part of it. However, according to Baumgartner and Wilutzky, making such 
an assumption is question-begging:  
[I]f we were to stick to the wording of MM, it is clear that Kaplan’s (2012) and Zednik’s 
(2011) project of settling that debate on the basis of MM is a nonstarter because MM’s 
application presupposes rather than produces clarity on the mereological relationship 
between cognitive and extracerebral processes. (Baumgartner & Wilutzky, 2017, pp. 
1110–1111) 
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Is this objection justified? Despite the initial plausibility of Baumgartner and Wilutzky’s worry, 
assuming parthood does not beg the question against the opponent of EC. According to MM, 
parthood is not sufficient for constitution. It is only a necessary condition. But the search for 
the bounds of cognition is a search for constituents of cognitive processes, not for parts in the 
sense used here (see Section 2.1). Rather, denying parthood would be question-begging as 
denying parthood is already sufficient for denying constitution. Hence, we should leave room 
for the possibility of a part-whole relation between a cognitive phenomenon and an extracranial 
element.  
A further argument for why assuming parthood is more plausible than its denial is that 
denying parthood leads to an odd picture. To see this, let us take the example of the memory 
demanding copying task Kaplan uses as an example of EC. Here, the phenomenon is a 
temporally extended cognitive behavior of a subject copying a pattern of colored blocks. It 
starts with task onset and ends when the pattern of blocks is completely copied. What would it 
mean to deny that the saccadic eye movements are parts of the subject’s behavior?  
Two pictures are possible. First, one might deny temporal containment. One could argue 
that the behavior of copying is scattered in the sense that it stops when the eyes start their 
saccadic movements and begins only after the eyes’ movements have started (see Figure 3a)). 
According to this picture, the saccadic eye movements would not occupy sub-regions of the 
spatiotemporal region of the copying behavior, and hence would not be part of it in the sense 
defined in Section 2.1. This is a very odd picture. First, we will not find the necessary clear-cut 
stating and end-points of the eye movements that would be necessary to draw this picture. 
Second, the eye movements will occur simultaneously with many other processes, such as 
neural activity, that opponents of EC would want to count as constituents of the cognitive 
behavior. Hence, they should not assume that the copying process is scattered in this way. 
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Figure 3 Possible strategies to deny parthood. The small circles stand for the putative constituent (e.g., saccadic eye-
movements), whereas the large slices stand for the phenomenon (e.g., the copying behavior). 
A second strategy to deny parthood is to deny spatial containment. One could argue that the 
eye movements, though temporally contained in the copying behavior, do not occur in the same 
spatial location. For example, the eye-movements might occur right next to the copying process 
(see Figure 3b)). How could one argue for such as claim? The only argument that comes to my 
mind is to insist that cognition only happens in the brain. But this would, obviously, beg the 
question against the defender of EC. 
We can conclude that both conditions of MM—parthood and mutual manipulability—can 
in principle be satisfied by external elements relative to cognitive phenomena. Not only the 
Inconsistency Problem can be avoided. Also, the Parthood Problem can be solved. But does 
that suffice to make the case for EC? 
 
3.3 The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness 
Based on the interpretation of MM along the lines of Krickel’s account as presented in Section 
3.1, and based on the clarification of the parthood condition presented in Section 3.2—can 
MM’s application to EC be successful? Can EC be defended based on MM? 
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At least, prima facie, the application of MM to EC delivers the right results. Saccadic eye-
movements are parts of the memory demanding copying behavior (given the reasoning from 
Section 3.2) and the former and the latter are mutually manipulable (as specified in Section 
3.1). Plausibly, if we change the copying task used by Ballard et al. by, for example, changing 
the pattern of colored blocks that is to be copied at t1 this will lead to a change in the eye-
movements at tn+1. If we intervene on the eye-movements by fixing the gaze at t2, the copying 
behavior will change afterwards (as is indicated by the fact that subjects need much more time). 
Hence, all conditions of the mutual manipulability account are satisfied.  
Still, the application of MM to EC runs into a problem. Consider the following argument: 
1. The subject’s arm movements are part of the subject’s copying behavior. 
2. The subject’s arm movements and her copying behavior are mutually manipulable. 
3. Hence, the subject’s arm movements are constituents of the copying behavior. 
Based on MM, this is a sound argument. Given the reasoning from Section 3.2, we should take 
the arm movements to be parts of the subject’s copying behavior. Also, given Krickel’s 
interpretation of MM introduced in Section 3.1, the arm movements and the copying behavior 
are plausibly mutually manipulable. It is easy to imagine that if you, for example, fixate the 
subject’s arms so that she cannot move them anymore, the copying behavior will be affected. 
Also, if you change the pattern of the colored blocks, the arm movements will differ. Thus, the 
two conditions of MM are satisfied, and the arm movements turn out to be constituents of the 
copying behavior. But should this lead us to accepting EC?  
Kaplan himself argues that arm movements “naturally seem like background conditions 
and not working parts of the memory mechanism underlying task performance” (Kaplan, 2012, 
p. 564). Thus, even defenders of EC are not willing to accept arm movements in copying tasks 
as verifying EC. However, given that arm movements satisfy MM it remains unclear what 
distinguishes them from cases that are counted as verifying EC. Note that the problem 
generalized as there are many analogous cases: moving your lips will turn out to be a 
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constitutive part of speech production, eye movements will be constitutive for reading, and 
finding your way to the MOMA will involve your legs as constitutive parts. None of these cases 
will be counted as verifying EC. Still, in all of these cases, MM seems to be satisfied.  
The examples indicate that the mechanisms that constitute cognitive behaviors will be 
extended purely due to the fact that we are dealing with cognitive behaviors (for a similar worry 
see Aizawa (2017, p. 4276)). Thus, as such MM cannot be sufficient to make the case for EC. 
What we need is a criterion that helps us to distinguish between those constituents of a cognitive 
behavior that are constituents of it qua the latter being a behavior, and those that are constituents 
qua the latter being a cognitive behavior. Finding such a criterion is what I call the Challenge 
of Trivial Extendedness (CTE).  
Before I come to discussing different strategies for meeting this challenge, I want to 
highlight that the trivial extendedness of cognitive behaviors is advantageous in one respect. 
Remember the problem mentioned at the end of Section 3.1. The problem was that by using 
Krickel’s account of MM, the whole endeavor seems to become question-begging. The reason 
was that Krickel’s account is non-reductive: X’s Φ-ing is a constituent of S’s Ψ-ing only if there 
is an ideal* top-down intervention into a temporal EIO-part of S’s Ψ-ing with respect to X’s Φ-
ing. This intervention will be ideal* because it affects not only the temporal EIO-part of S’s Ψ-
ing but also at least one of the constituents of the temporal EIO-part. But if the constituents of 
the temporal EIO-part are external too, we have to already presuppose that S’s Ψ-ing has 
external constituents. Hence, (it seems) we have to presuppose the truth of EC. 
Based on the insight that cognitive behaviors are extended in a trivial sense, one can solve 
this problem. Take again the example of the copying task used by Ballard et al. According to 
Kaplan, the top-down intervention on the copying behavior with respect to saccadic eye-
movements consists in “engaging subjects in this cognitively demanding task” (Kaplan, 2012, 
p. 564). Let us assume that subjects are engaged in this task by receiving verbal instructions by 
an experimenter. In order for this intervention to be ideal* in the way required by Krickel it has 
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to be an intervention into a temporal EIO-part of the phenomenon, say, the subject’s looking at 
the pattern-to-be-copied, and one of the constituents of this temporal EIO-part, which is, for 
example, the activity of the retina. Does this mean that we already have to presuppose the truth 
of EC because the retina has to be assumed to be a constituent of the copying behavior?  
We do not. The reason is that not every constituent of a cognitive behavior will validate EC 
as argued above. Nobody would deny that behaviors such as the one described in the study by 
Ballard et al. involve the body: subjects have to look at the pattern, move their arms to move 
the blocks, etc. Hence, for every cognitive behavior the identification of some constituents can 
be presupposed in our analysis as long as these are constituents of the cognitive behavior qua 
behavior. Hence, Krickel’s approach can be applied without begging the question. 
4 Meeting the CTE: What are Cognitive Constituents? 
In the previous section I argued that MM alone cannot be sufficient to argue in favor of EC. 
MM identifies also purely behavioral elements such as the arm movements in Ballard et al.’s 
copying task, as constituents of the cognitive behavior at hand. As a consequence, elements 
would come out as validating EC that nobody, not even defenders of EC, would want to count 
as cognitive elements. Hence, as a sufficient criterion, MM renders EC absurd. We need a way 
to distinguish between constituents of a cognitive behavior qua being cognitive and those that 
are constituents qua being behaviors. But can we meet the CTE?  
Clearly, any strategy for addressing this challenge must not refer to any mark of the 
cognitive. The starting point of the present discussion was to accept that there is no account of 
the mark of the cognitive that defenders as well as opponents of EC accept. Hence, in order to 
avoid begging the question one basic working assumption of the present endeavor was: there is 
no mark of the cognitive. What we are looking for is a criterion to determine the extension of 
‘cognitive constituent’ rather than its intension.3 
                                               
3 It is crucial to keep in mind that the criterion I am going to develop is not meant to identify cognitive constituents 
in any pre-defined sense of ‘cognitive.’ Rather, it will allow to draw a distinction between trivial cases of 
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Furthermore, in order to save the general strategy of using resources from the new 
mechanistic account to argue for EC, the challenge should be answered with the help of tools 
that are not foreign to the new mechanistic thinking and the explanatory practice of the 
cognitive and life sciences. Indeed, in a recent paper, Hewitson, Kaplan, and Sutton (2018) 
address a worry that looks similar to the one at issue that is compatible with the general strategy. 
They attempt to solve the problem by invoking the notion of causal specificity introduced by 
James Woodward (2010) that is in line with Craver’s original ideas regarding MM. Hence, 
Hewitson, Kaplan, and Sutton’s suggestion seems promising with regard to answering the CTE. 
In what follows, I will present their idea. I will argue that their suggestion fails as an answer to 
the CTE. 
 
4.1 Causal Specificity  
In a recent paper, Hewitson, Kaplan, and Sutton (2018) address a worry that looks similar to 
the one at issue: they argue that although the application of MM in the context of EC is prima 
facie fruitful, “there is a residual worry that MM is still not restrictive enough” (p. 28). Indeed, 
they argue that Craver himself was aware of this worry in the original formulation of MM in 
his (2007b)-book. They cite an example used by Craver (2007b, p. 158) to illustrate the 
problem: a subject’s performing a word stem completion task and her heart’s pumping blood 
might satisfy MM because if you lesion the heart, the subject will not be able to perform the 
word stem completion task anymore; and if you let the subject perform “torturous word-stem 
completion tasks outside of the context of the request for explanation” her heart beat will be 
affected (2007b, p. 158). Hence, the heart’s pumping blood turns out to be a component of the 
mechanism for word stem completion. However, nobody would take the heart’s activity to be 
explanatory relevant for how word stem completion works. Hence, MM is insufficient. 
                                               
extendedness and more interesting ones. As I will argue below, the interesting cases deserve the label ‘cognitive’ 
in light of the assumptions of the present strategy as they are components of mechanisms for general cognitive 
capacities rather than just of the mechanisms that are counted as manifestations of these cognitive capacities.  
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Inspired by Craver’s own suggested solution, Hewitson et al. propose to use the notion of 
causal specificity introduced by Woodward (2010) to distinguish between constituents and 
what they and Craver call background conditions (2018, pp. 28–29): intervening into 
background conditions will have rather nonspecific effects on the phenomenon at hand. For 
example, lesioning the heart will completely extinguish the performance of word stem 
completion. But it is impossible to intervene on the heart’s activity in a way that leads to more 
specific changes in the performance of word stem completion. Hewitson et al. frame this 
suggestion as a new strategy to investigate potential cases of EC. They suggest that a 
comparison of the ‘specificity profiles’ of internal and external elements may provide useful: if 
it turned out that the profiles are similar, this would provide a new argument in favor of EC 
(2018, p. 29). 
Although Hewitson et al.’s idea of combining MM with the causal specificity seems 
promising with regard to distinguishing between constituents and causal background 
conditions, it will not suffice to meet the CTE—for the main reason that trivial cases of 
extendedness are not background conditions of mechanisms. This is already indicated by the 
fact that distinguishing between constituents and causal background conditions poses a general 
challenge for MM independently of its application to EC. If the heart’s activity turns out to be 
a component of the mechanism for word stem completion on the basis of MM, this shows that 
MM fails as an account of constitutive relevance in general. In order for MM to be successful, 
one has to implement a criterion that excludes cases like the heartbeat case in relation to word 
stem completion. But this has nothing to do with the CTE. This challenge arises even if the 
problem of causal background conditions is solved. 
 CTE is specific to MM’s application to EC. The crucial point to note is that, given the basic 
motivation of MM, arm movements are plausibly counted as components of the relevant 
mechanism rather than background condition to it. Arm movements are explanatory relevant 
for how subjects perform the copying behavior in the setup used in this study—in contrast to, 
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for example, the subject’s heart-beat which is not specific to the behavior at hand. In other 
words: arm movements are constituents rather than mere causal background conditions relative 
to the copying behavior. Causal background conditions in this example would be, for example, 
the heartbeat, blood circulation, gravity, or the oxygen concentration in the surrounding the 
subjects. With regard to these elements the test for causal specificity seems promising.  
But this will not work for arm movements. Indeed, it is possible to intervene on arm 
movements in a way that leads to rather subtle changes in task behavior. For example, if one 
were to move the subjects’ arms right before they place the blocks, the copied pattern would 
look slightly different. There are interventions into arm movements that do seem to have rather 
fine-grained causal influence over the copying behavior. But, as already explained above, this 
is a good result as arm movements are plausibly constituents of the mechanism for the copying 
behavior investigated by Ballard et al. The CTE requires us to find a criterion that distinguishes 
between different kinds of mechanistic constituents, i.e., elements that rightfully satisfy MM 
(and causal specificity). The question is not whether external elements can be components of 
mechanisms for cognitive behaviors (this seems unproblematic). Rather, the question is under 
which conditions system-external components of mechanisms for cognitive behaviors should 
count as validating EC.  
In order to be able to express this difference, I will use the term constitutive background to 
refer to those constituents that never count as validating EC (even if they are system-external). 
These components provide the constitutive background for the cognitive constituents. Only if 
it can be shown that the cognitive components can be external to the brain, this should be 
counted as validating EC. The CTE, thus, can be rephrased: What is the difference between the 
constitutive background and cognitive constituents? 
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4.2 Behavior Specificity 
The first step towards answering the question posed at the end of the previous sub-section is to 
highlight that cognitive behaviors investigated in experiments, such as Ballard et al.’s, are 
usually just a means to an end for the actual aim of investigating a more general cognitive 
capacity. For example, the study conducted by Ballard et al. does not primarily aim at finding 
out how subjects copy patterns of colored blocks. Rather, the aim is to get general insights about 
short-term or working memory, i.e., the capacity to recall a certain amount of information after 
a short period of time.4 In other words, cognitive scientists are primarily interested in cognitive 
capacities which are investigated by conducting experiments testing their manifestations, i.e., 
cognitive behaviors.  
Based on this consideration, the idea that I want to put forward here is that the cognitive 
constituents of a behavior are those elements that constitute the behavior because the behavior 
is a manifestation of a general cognitive capacity and not due to the specificities of the behavior 
chosen for the purposes of the experiment. In contrast to that, the constitutive background is 
composed of those constituents that are specific to the behavior that was chosen to be tested in 
the experiment. In other words: the constitutive background is what I call behavior specific, 
whereas cognitive constituents are behavior unspecific. In this section, I spell this idea out in 
more detail. 
Following Cummins (1983, p. 53), cognitive capacities can be characterized in terms of 
input-output conditions. For example, working memory can be characterized as the capacity to 
recall a certain amount of information (output) a short time after receiving the information 
(input). A behavior counts as a manifestation of this cognitive capacity if and only if it 
                                               
4 Indeed, Ballard et al.’s study does not aim at finding the mechanism for working memory. Rather, the goal is 
formulated as “delimiting the upper bounds of [working] memory in (…) the performance of everyday tasks“ 
(Ballard et al., 1995, p. 66). Thus, Ballard et al. are investigating to which degree a specific mechanism, namely 
working memory, is used in natural situations. Here, we are interested in the question of whether mechanisms for 
cognitive behaviors can be extended. Hence, in order to be able to use Ballard et al.’s study as an example, we 
have to frame it in terms of an investigation aiming to find the mechanism for working memory.  
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constitutes a process that connects the input with the output that characterizes the capacity at 
issue. For example, in Ballard et al.’s study, the behavior connecting the input (‘receiving 
information’) and the output (‘recall information’) is the copying behavior in which subjects 
look at a pattern of colored blocks and use their hands to move the blocks from the store. Note, 
that in that sense, only successful behaviors, i.e., those that actually produce the output, count 
as manifestations of the respective capacity. 
For each cognitive capacity there will be different behaviors whose performance counts 
as a manifestation of it. For example, the inputs and outputs characterizing working memory 
could also be connected by a change-detection behavior (Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 
2011). Furthermore, for any given type of behavior (e.g., copying behavior, change-detection 
behavior) there are different ways the inputs and outputs can be operationalized in order to 
conduct experiments on the behaviors. For example, Ballard et al. use an operationalization of 
the input-output characterization of working memory according to which the input is ‘subjects 
visually perceive a pattern of colored blocks’ and the output is ‘manually produce an instance 
of the same pattern.’ They could have investigated the same type of behavior by 
operationalizing the relevant input and output type differently. For example, they could have 
asked the subjects to verbally report which block they would put where instead of actually doing 
it; they could have chosen different stimuli; and so on. 
The core idea now is as follows: In order to experimentally investigate the mechanism 
underlying a cognitive capacity (such as working memory) one can only investigate behavioral 
manifestations of that capacity (such as the copying behaviors investigated by Ballard et al. 
where subjects used their hands to copy colored blocks). The mechanism that one will find by 
conducting experiments on these behavioral manifestations will involve elements that are not 
relevant for the execution of the cognitive capacity as such but only for the execution of that 
particular behavioral instance given the particular task setup chosen for the concrete 
experiment. Thus, in order to find out which elements are constitutive of the cognitive capacity, 
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we have to be able to distinguish between those components of the mechanism for the behavior 
that are components qua the behavior’s being a manifestation of a general cognitive capacities 
and those elements that are components of the mechanism only qua the behavior’s being that 
particular behavior. This is what the criterion of ‘behavior specificity’ is supposed to do. Based 
on these considerations, the criterion can be spelled out as follows: 
(behavior specificity)   
a) A constituent of a behavior B is behavior specific if and only if it is a component 
of the mechanism for B under some but not all operationalizations of the inputs 
and outputs that characterize the cognitive capacity of which B is a manifestation. 
b) A constituent of a behavior B is behavior unspecific if and only if it is a component 
of the mechanism for B under all operationalizations of the inputs and outputs that 
characterize the cognitive capacity of which B is a manifestation. 
Figure 4 illustrates the experimental procedure to test for behavior specificity. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of behavior specificity: In all experiments the same cognitive capacity C characterized by input I and 
output O is tested by investigating the mechanisms for the different manifestations of C, i.e., behaviors B1, B2, B3, … Bn (the 
circles and arrows surrounded by the dotted lines). The behaviors differ in how I and O are operationalized (indicated by 
small letters in and on). Some constituents will occur in all mechanisms (grey circles), which are thus behavior unspecific. 
Some constituents will occur in only some (white circles), which are thus behavior specific. 
Based on the notion of behavior specificity we can answer the CTE: the constitutive background 
consists of components that are behavior specific whereas the cognitive constituents are 
behavior unspecific—they are cognitive constituents because they are constitutive for a specific 
cognitive capacity. This provides us with the following account of cognitive constituents: 
(cognitive constituent) X’s φ-ing is a cognitive constituent of a cognitive behavior ψ-ing 
of a system S iff: 
(i) X’s φ-ing is a spatiotemporal part of S’s ψ-ing, 
(ii) X’s φ-ing and S’s ψ-ing are mutually manipulable (and they satisfy causal 
specificity), 
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(iii) X’s φ-ing is behavior unspecific. 
Based on this account, it can be shown that the arm movements performed by the subjects in 
Ballard et al.’s study are not cognitive constituents but rather part of the constitutive 
background. As explained above, in the original study, working memory (i.e., the capacity to 
recall a certain amount of information a short time after receiving the information) was 
operationalized as ‘subjects visually perceive a pattern of colored blocks and manually produce 
an instance of the same pattern.’ In order to evaluate whether the arm movements belong to the 
constitutive background or not, we have to test other operationalizations of the capacity to recall 
a certain amount of information a short time after receiving the information and see whether 
the arm movements do not occur. One way to change the operationalization is to have subjects 
verbally report what they would do (and have a speech detecting computer program create the 
copy) instead of asking them to produce the pattern themselves. Clearly, this behavior would 
still count as copying behavior which would still be a manifestation of working memory. Also, 
clearly, in this version of the task, subjects will not use their arms. Hence, the arm movements 
are behavior specific and thus part of the constitutive background rather than cognitive 
constituents of the behavior. 
What about the saccadic eye movements? Is there an operationalization of working 
memory that does not involve saccadic eye movements? Assume the copying task is changed 
such that subjects create copies based on tactile input while being blindfolded. I am not aware 
of any study testing this, but it is plausible to assume that there will not be any saccadic eye 
movements. However, it is not clear whether blindfolded subjects would indeed be able to 
succeed in the copying task. It may turn out that in versions of the task that use non-visual 
inputs subjects are indeed unable to succeed. Hence, whether the saccadic eye movements are 
constitutive of the cognitive capacity at hand (working memory) or not, and thus whether they 
are part of the constitutive background in the mechanism for the specific version of copying 
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behavior used by Ballard et al. rather than cognitive constituents remains an open empirical 
question.  
Can we find any examples that clearly speak in favor of EC based on this notion of behavior 
specificity? Consider an example well-known in the EC literature: gestures (Chu & Kita, 2011; 
Freksa, Olteţeanu, Barkowsky, van de Ven, & Schultheis, 2017; Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 
2013; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001). In his (2010)-book, Andy Clark indeed uses 
a reasoning in line with the present approach to argue for the claim that gestures can constitute 
thought. He bases his claim on the following empirical evidence (Clark, 2010, p. 123): 
a) We gesture when talking on the phone. 
b) We gesture when talking to ourselves. 
c) We gesture in the dark when nobody can see. 
d) Gesturing increases with task difficulty. 
e) Gesturing increases when speakers must choose between options. 
f) Gesturing increases when reasoning about a problem rather than merely 
describing the problem or a known solution.  
We only have to add: 
g) When gesturing is not allowed, success in problem-solving tasks decreases (Chu 
& Kita, 2011). 
On the assumption that hand movements are spatiotemporal parts of the thinking behavior (see 
Section 3.2), the evidence provided in statements d), e), and f) corresponds to evidence about 
top-down manipulability of gesturing via interventions into the thinking behavior. The evidence 
referred to in statement g) corresponds to evidence about bottom-up manipulability. Statements 
a), b), and c) might indicate that gesturing is indeed behavior unspecific: independently of the 
operationalization of the input and output (e.g., via phone vs. via written instructions) gestures 
occur.  
The problem for Clark’s reasoning only is that ‘thinking’ is a much too broad cognitive 
capacity – cognitive scientists usually deal with much more specific descriptions of cognitive 
capacities. For example, ‘thinking’ may include capacities such as problem-solving, decision-
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making, spatial navigation, speech processing, and so on. It is very unlikely to find any 
mechanism that is shared by all these capacities. Indeed, the role of gestures is usually discussed 
in the context of the investigation of spatial problem-solving (Chu & Kita, 2011; Freksa et al., 
2017; Hostetter & Alibali, 2007), i.e., the cognitive capacity of solving spatial problems (the 
input is ‘being presented with a spatial problem’, whereas the output is ‘presenting a solution’). 
As manifestations of this capacity, researchers investigate behaviors in, for example, mental 
rotation tasks, route learning tasks, or rotating gear tasks. Indeed, for all of these types of 
behaviors, the occurrence of co-thought gestures has been documented for different 
operationalizations of the inputs and outputs (Eielts et al., 2018). This suggests that gestures 
are indeed cognitive constituents of spatial problem-solving. However, to prove this claim, one 
has to show that under all operationalizations of the inputs and outputs that characterize the 
capacity of spatial problem-solving gestures occur.  
This brings us to one consequence of the present approach: it is much more difficult to 
prove that something is a cognitive constituent than to show that it is part of the constitutive 
background. In order to find constitutive background elements, one only has to show that there 
is one operationalization of the capacity that does not involve the constituent at issue. In order 
to show that a constituent is a cognitive constituent, one has to show that it occurs in every 
operationalization of the cognitive capacity5. Since the list of potential operationalizations of a 
given cognitive capacity might be rather long (though in principle finite), one has to conduct 
rather many experiments (and then inductively infer that a given constituent is cognitive). It is 
important to note that this problem arises for defenders as well as opponents of EC. In order to 
establish that, say, the activity of a certain brain region is a cognitive constituent of a given 
                                               
5 This consequence is similar to the implication of Baumgartner and Wilutzky’s account according to which 
constituents can be empirically identified only abductively. However, note that their account is one of mechanistic 
constituents (vs. non-constituents) in general. Here, we are dealing with an account of cognitive constituents (vs. 
non-cognitive constituents).  
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behavior, one has to show that the brain region is active under every operationalization of the 
relevant cognitive capacity.  
A further potential complication for the suggested account of behavior specificity is that 
many cognitive behaviors are plausibly multiply realized by different mechanisms. Even given 
the same operationalization of the inputs and outputs, there may be different mechanisms that 
constitute the cognitive behavior connecting them. This should not count as indicating behavior 
specificity of the mechanistic components—otherwise even components that are 
uncontroversial cognitive constituents would fail the test. For example, memory behavior may 
involve brain areas or micro ships implanted into the brain—and both should intuitively come 
out as cognitive constituents even if they do not occur in all operationalizations of memory 
behavior. This problem can be solved by highlighting that mechanisms are individuated relative 
to the behavior of a specific object (type) (see Section 2.2). It will not be surprising that, for 
example, memory mechanisms differ between lay people and memory experts, healthy subjects 
and patients, children and adults, and humans and non-human animals. Hence, behavior 
specificity has to be relativized to a specific type of objects.  
Finally, a consequence of the present proposal is that whether something is a cognitive 
constituent or not can only be determined locally. Claims such as “Gesturing is a cognitive 
process” or “Activity in the pre-frontal cortex is a cognitive process” are false as long as they 
are not relativized to a specific cognitive capacity. One and the same element can be cognitive 
relative to one capacity but non-cognitive relative to another. For example, gesturing may be a 
cognitive constituent in spatial problem-solving but not in social communication. 
To summarize: based on the present proposal, we can provide a definition of what 
cognitive constituents are that incorporates MM, is in line with the general strategy of using the 
new mechanists’ tools to defend EC, is independent of any putative mark of the cognitive, and 
can be accepted by defenders and opponents of EC alike. Finally, based on the present proposal 
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we can identify a promising example of embodied cognition: gestures in spatial problem-
solving.  
5 Conclusion 
Three problems for the strategy of applying MM to EC were discussed in this paper: The 
Inconsistency Problem, the Parthood Problem, and the CTE. I argued that all of these problems 
can be solved if MM is interpreted along the lines of Krickel (2018), the cognitive phenomena 
are taken to be cognitive behaviors that trivially involve the body, and MM is combined with a 
test for what I call behavior specificity. Cognitive constituents, apart from satisfying MM, are 
behavior unspecific in that they occur under every operationalization of the cognitive capacity 
of which the behavior is a manifestation. Based on the present proposal, a promising case 
speaking in favor of EC could be found: gestures as cognitive constituents of spatial problem-
solving. Based on the account of ‘cognitive constituent’ developed in this paper, the debate on 
EC can be revived. The criteria can be accepted by defenders and opponents of EC and allow 
for a reevaluation of the empirical evidence put forward to argue for or against EC based on a 
non-question-begging criterion. 
 
Acknowledgments: I thank Ken Aizawa, Albert Newen, Matej Kohár, Julia Wolf, Sabrina 
Coninx, Pascale Willemsen, Francesco Marchi, Alfredo Vernazzani, Sam Cosper, the members 
of the DFG funded research training group “Situated Cognition,” and two anonymous reviewers 
for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Also, I presented the paper at different workshops 
and conferences where I received helpful feedback. These workshops and conferences 
included: the symposium Causation and Computation in Neuroscience (Jerusalem 2017) 
organized by Oron Shagrir, Jens Harbecke, and Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, ECAP (München 2017), 
Evolving Minds – A Workshop with Dan Hutto and Eric Myin (Bochum 2017) organized by 
Tobias Schlicht, and the GAP-Satellite Workshop organized by the RTG Situated Cognition 
accepted in Mind and Language   
THIS IS A PREPRINT DIFFERENT FROM THE FINAL VERSION 
 34 
(Cologne 2018). This publication is funded by the DFG-Graduiertenkolleg "Situated 
Cognition", GRK-2185/1. 
 
 
References 
Abramova, K., & Slors, M. (2018). Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1–24. 
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14(1), 
43–64. 
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Blackwell Pub. 
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In R. Menary (Ed.), 
The extended mind (pp. 67–80). MIT Press. 
Aizawa, K. (2010). The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited. Cognitive Systems Research, 
11(4), 332–342. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.07.001 
Aizawa, K. (2017). Cognition and behavior. Synthese, 194, 4269–4288. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0645-5 
Ballard, D. H., Hayhoe, M. M., Pelz, J. B., Ballard, D., Hayhoe, M., Pelz, J., … Yarbus, A. 
(1995). Memory Representations in Natural Tasks. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
7(1), 66–80. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.1995.7.1.66 
Baumgartner, M. (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23(2), 161–178. 
Baumgartner, M., & Casini, L. (2017). An Abductive Theory of Constitution. Philosophy of 
Science, 84(2), 214–233. http://doi.org/10.1086/690716 
Baumgartner, M., Casini, L., & Krickel, B. (2018). Horizontal Surgicality and Mechanistic 
Constitution. Erkenntnis. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0033-5 
Baumgartner, M., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Constitutive Relevance, Mutual Manipulability, 
and Fat-Handedness. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(3), 731–756. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv003 
Baumgartner, M., & Wilutzky, W. (2017). Is it possible to experimentally determine the 
extension of cognition? Philosophical Psychology, 30(8), 1104–1125. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1355453 
Bechtel, W. (2006). Discovering Cell Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press. 
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms. Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive 
Neuroscience. New York/London: Routledge. 
Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 421–441. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.010 
Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. C. (2010). Discovering Complexity. Decomposition and 
Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Chu, M., & Kita, S. (2011). The Nature of Gestures’ Beneficial Role in Spatial Problem 
Solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140(1), 102–116. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021790 
Clark, A. (2010). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. 
Oxford University Press. Retrieved from https://books.google.de/books?id=I-
tSEhdEorUC 
accepted in Mind and Language   
THIS IS A PREPRINT DIFFERENT FROM THE FINAL VERSION 
 35 
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. 
Craver, C. F. (2007a). Constitutive explanatory relevance. Journal of Philosophical Research, 
32(Section II), 1–20. http://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2007_4 
Craver, C. F. (2007b). Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of 
neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Craver, C. F., & Bechtel, W. (2007). Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes. 
Biology & Philosophy, 22(4), 547–563. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8 
Craver, C. F., & Darden, L. (2001). Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of 
Spatial Memory. In P. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and 
Method in Neuroscience (pp. 112–137). Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press. 
Craver, C. F., & Darden, L. (2013). In Search of Mechanisms. Discoveries across the Life 
Sciences. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Cummins, R. (1983). The nature of psychological explanation. MIT Press. Retrieved from 
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/nature-psychological-explanation 
Darden, L. (2002). Strategies for discovering mechanisms: Schema instantiation, modular 
subassembly, forward/backward chaining. Philosophy of Science, 69(3), S354–S365. 
http://doi.org/10.1086/341858 
Eielts, C., Pouw, W., Ouwehand, K., van Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., & Paas, F. (2018). Co-
thought gesturing supports more complex problem solving in subjects with lower visual 
working-memory capacity. Psychological Research, 1–12. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1065-9 
Eronen, M. I., & Brooks, D. S. (2014). Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem 
and Provisional Solution. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 28(2), 185–
202. http://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.932529 
Freksa, C., Olteţeanu, A.-M., Barkowsky, T., van de Ven, J., & Schultheis, H. (2017). Spatial 
Problem Solving in Spatial Structures (pp. 18–29). Springer, Cham. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69456-6_2 
Gallagher, S. (2018). New mechanisms and the enactivist concept of constitution. In M. P. 
Guta (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Consciousness (pp. 207–220). London: Routledge. 
Gebharter, A. (2015). Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 1–23. http://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12247 
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Prospect Geights: 
Waveland Press, Inc. 
Glennan, S. (2010). Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 362–381. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-
1592.2010.00375.x 
Goldin-Meadow, S., & Alibali, M. W. (2013). Gesture’s Role in Speaking, Learning, and 
Creating Language. Annual Review of Psychology, 64(1), 257–283. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143802 
Hewitson, C. L., Kaplan, D. M., & Sutton, J. (2018). Yesterday the earwig, today man, 
tomorrow the earwig? Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 13, 25–30. 
http://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2018.130003 
Hostetter, A. B., & Alibali, M. W. (2007). Raise your hand if you’re spatial: Relations 
between verbal and spatial skills and gesture production. Gesture, 7(1), 73–95. 
http://doi.org/10.1075/gest.7.1.05hos 
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Book. 
MIT Press. Retrieved from https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolving-enactivism 
Japyassú, H. F., & Laland, K. N. (2017). Extended spider cognition. Animal Cognition, 20(3), 
375–395. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-017-1069-7 
accepted in Mind and Language   
THIS IS A PREPRINT DIFFERENT FROM THE FINAL VERSION 
 36 
Kaiser, M. I., & Krickel, B. (2017). The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic 
Phenomena. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68, 745–779. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv058 
Kaplan, D. M. (2012). How to demarcate the boundaries of cognition. Biology and 
Philosophy, 27(4), 545–570. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9308-4 
Kästner, L. (2017). Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience, Causal Explanations, Mechanisms 
and Experimental Manipulations. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. 
http://doi.org/10.1515/9783110530940 
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental 
Causation. MIT Press. 
Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95(1), 3–36. 
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2015). Extended Cognition & the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy: In Search 
for a Diachronic and Dynamical Conception of Constitution. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 90(2), 320–360. http://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12039 
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2017). From mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and 
implications. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(5), 863–878. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9483-x 
Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action. 
Cognitive Science, 18(4), 513–549. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1 
Krickel, B. (2018). Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 68, 58–67. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.003 
Leuridan, B. (2012). Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive 
relevance in mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63(2), 399–427. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr036 
Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 556–567. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2025310 
Lewis, D. (1986). Events. In D. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II (pp. 241–269). 
Oxford University Press. 
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy 
of Science, 67(1), 1–25. 
Newen, A. (2017). What are cognitive processes? An example-based approach. Synthese, 194, 
4251–4268. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0812-3 
O’Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual 
consciousness. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 939-73; discussion 973-1031. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12239892 
Pöyhönen, S. (2014). Explanatory power of extended cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 
27(5), 735–759. http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.766789 
Romero, F. (2015). Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms. Synthese, 192(11), 
3731–3755. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0718-0 
Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Morey, C. C., & Cowan, N. (2011). How to measure working 
memory capacity in the change detection paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
18(2), 324–30. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-011-0055-3 
Rupert, R. D. (2009). Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford University Press. 
Rupert, R. D. (2010). Systems, functions, and intrinsic natures: On Adams and Aizawa’s The 
Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 23(1), 113–123. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09515080903538867 
Theiner, G., Allen, C., & Goldstone, R. L. (2010). Recognizing group cognition. Cognitive 
Systems Research, 11(4), 378–395. http://doi.org/10.1016/J.COGSYS.2010.07.002 
van Eck, D., & Looren de Jong, H. (2016). Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems 
demarcation, and extended cognition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part 
accepted in Mind and Language   
THIS IS A PREPRINT DIFFERENT FROM THE FINAL VERSION 
 37 
A, 59(Supplement C), 11–21. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.05.002 
Wesp, R., Hesse, J., Keutmann, D., & Wheaton, K. (2001). Gestures maintain spatial imagery. 
The American Journal of Psychology, 114(4), 591–600. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11789342 
Wilson, R. A. (2004). Boundaries of the mind: the individual in the fragile sciences. 
Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.de/books/about/Boundaries_of_the_Mind.html?id=WXBmuko2CqI
C&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y 
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford 
University Press. 
Woodward, J. (2010). Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of 
explanation. Biology & Philosophy, 25(3), 287–318. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-010-
9200-z 
Woodward, J. (2015). Interventionism and Causal Exclusion. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 91(2), 303–347. http://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12095 
Zednik, C. (2011). The Nature of Dynamical Explanation*. Philosophy of Science, 78(2), 
238–263. http://doi.org/10.1086/659221 
 
 
